In this paper we present the security features of a novel protocol stack designed for carrying signalling information in the UMTS Core Network (CN) and more specifically for its Packet Switched domain. We compare its features with proposed protocols by the Internet and Telecommunications Community, such as the IPsec and Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) architectures, moving on to analysing FCNS's advantages over these proposals. We evaluate our protocol stack and reveal future work, and other uses of it, in various operating environments.
INTRODUCTION
The UMTS CN is defined in two architectures developed by the Third Generation Partnership Program (3GPP), Release 99 and Release 4/5, the latter previously known as Release 2000. Our work is focused on the platform described in Release 99 (3GPP (1) ) that resembles the architecture of the General Packet Radio System (GPRS) in order to allow for a straightforward migration from the second (2G) to the third generation (3G) mobile systems. Consequently the UMTS CN inherits and enhances the capabilities of the 2G systems, but on the same time its limitations as well, as far as security is concerned.
The protocols that support the operation of the CN for its packet switched domain are the Internet Protocol (IP) that serves as the backbone for carrying signalling information and internetworking with different networks, GPRS Tunnelling Protocol (GTP) for controlling the communication between the various elements, SS7, CAMEL Application Part (CAP) and so on. ATM, GTP, SCTP and IP protocols are also used to form the transport network protocol architecture for the UMTS CN. The disadvantages of using various different protocols to form a robust signalling stack are not discussed in great detail, though emphasis is given on the disadvantages their use present in the security management of the network.
Proposed Schemes And Disadvantages
There are various protocol suites that are used for the UMTS core network, including transit network control protocols, service control protocols, packet data protocols and so on. Their use, as well as the different architectures used to support their operation, are given in Kaaranen et al (2) .
The disadvantages associated with the use of the various protocols to form these suites fall into many categories, the most important being those associated with performance and security.
Performance Issues. Performance in networks can be measured in many different ways depending on the operator's point of view, encompassing issues such as processing time in switches, round trip delays, end-toend delays, system's synchronisation and error correction. All these matters are important to the design and implementation of a system and are directly related to the protocols used in order to setup and run a network. For the UMTS CN every protocol suite is composed of a different set of rules, where each one of them requires different operating and processing procedures than another. A typical example is the case of the IP transport of user data, which makes use of the GTP to serve as the tunnelling protocol for the user plane. Figure 1 illustrates the arrangement of the protocols used, as taken from 2. In the case presented in Figure 1 , the suite accommodates four protocols used to define it. Each one of them requires a different header processing time and load, mapping of its messages to the protocol below and more importantly interoperation with the other protocols. Although the protocols have been amended for their use in mobile systems than when operating in a simple network environment, interoperability problems may arise that could degrade the system's performance. Error detection and correction exists for each one of the protocols but problems may arise from the mapping procedures of the various packet formats, due to the nature of the heterogeneous environment and the lack of appropriate and efficient fault management techniques.
In addition, the use of different protocols adds to the complexity of the system that may result in a less robust platform and in a more difficult and not very well defined implementation. A complex approach may also result in the system's misuse, due to the lack of strict and simple definitions that may cause potential performance and security problems. Security Issues. Our main concern that led us to the development of FCNS is the security management of the UMTS CN R99. The problems that constitute the need for a novel approach lie in the limitations associated with the set of rules used in the UMTS protocol suites, such as GTP, IP and UDP.
The GPRS tunnelling protocol does not provide for the necessary security functions that could be used in order to strengthen and enhance the system's integrity and immunity against both passive and active attacks. R99 makes use of GTP initially developed for 2G systems, where the data transferred in the network, as well as the authentication keys, were sent unencrypted. This can drive an attacker to obtain valuable information exchanged in the network and compromise the data in any unauthorised matter. UMTS is a system that will be used in order to introduce and exploit the full potential of the mobile-commerce (m-commerce) concept, where vital subscriber information, like credit card numbers, addresses and full names will need to be in transit. It is therefore important to adopt a secure solution in order to protect this information, and, at the same time, ensure that the signalling between the network elements responsible for the forwarding of that data is protected as well.
Furthermore, the use of the IP protocol, and more specifically, the Mobile IP (MIP) does not ensure the network's security against active attacks. Node impersonation, mobile agents masquerading, attacks on the Domain Name Server (DNS) and the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) may result in spoofing and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to be successful, jeopardising network's operation. The proposed IPsec and SCTP solutions are refined for the Release 4/5 version of the UMTS CN, although these platforms too suffer from problems associated with their mechanisms and operations as described in Ferguson and Schneier (3) and Bellovin (4).
In particular, the documentation produced by Steward et al (5) composing the standard behind SCTP, makes special note on the protocol's inability to counter manin-the-middle attacks that may result in the SCTP messages being intercepted and altered in transit. Additionally, its handshake mechanism during connection establishment phase does not ensure protection against traffic analysis, a problem that is not solved by the use of the proposed protocols forming the underlying subnetwork. The messages exchanged are sent unencrypted, and, although the system is protected against integrity and impersonation attacks, an attacker could alter its contents and force a DoS attack, even having the network establishment phase become unsuccessful, and hence deny the setting up of a particular connection.
Moreover, the system's alert mechanisms based on the error protocols incorporated with the different platforms forming a UMTS CN suite, exchange messages that are sent unsecured and could be used by unauthorised parties to exploit vulnerabilities present in the network.
Additional Implementation Pitfalls. Most of the currently used cryptographic and security applications and protocols make use of secret keys, in order to authenticate and sign a message and vice versa, that is to decrypt and verify the message's integrity. These keys are produced by using additional mechanisms, like random number generators, or other means of producing an initial for the keystream generator seed. The approaches adopted by system operators are the exclusion of the user or subscriber from this process and the creation of the seeds using deterministic approaches that may not produce the adequate results. To overcome such problems, we have proposed a solution that makes use of strong cryptographic keys produced by the user, which personalise the security mechanisms of a connection ensuring that another connection will not use the same keys all over again.
FUTURE CORE NETWORKS SYSTEM
FCNS is a system designed according to the OSI layered principles, which offer great flexibility in additions and updates of the protocol stack. Its security part, whose functions and mechanisms are governed by the Security Layer Protocol, have been evaluated to strengthen the integrity and authentication of the information carried between the CN elements of the Release 99 architecture for UMTS.
Architecture And Layers
Its novelty, compared to other solutions developed by the telecommunications and academic community, is that its deign ensures the security of all layers of the communication, from the context exchange process down to the physical data transport over a link. The architecture of the protocol is depicted in Figure 2 with the security layer being one the most important issues of our design. The functions associated with the other layers of the stack follow the principles of the OSI 7-layer model. The User-Defined layer is responsible for the semantics and the session establishment of the connection. The Transmission layer enforces the necessary handshake mechanisms, and reliably transfers the data between the ultimate end-nodes. The End-toend layer is responsible for the routing of the FCNS packets between various subnetworks, error detection and correction techniques and the Physical layer resembling the interface between the FCNS and the physical medium protocols.
Figure 2: FCNS architecture
The Security layer (SL) is the protocol responsible for enforcing the necessary security functions and imposes the FCNS security rules to the messages exchanged over a connection. It initiates the functions that encrypt/decrypt a message, verify its validity, secure a communication channel both on an end-to-end and link basis and secure the error protocol of FCNS. Furthermore, it governs the functions that setup and maintain the FCNS keystream generation, which provide for the authentication keys used over a connection. In addition the security layer makes use of the existing databases present in the network eliminating the need of additional enhancements that would increase the network's cost, unlike solutions like IPsec where its design is based on additional databases that provide for its operation. In the following sections we analyse the features of the security layer, presenting its advantages over the other approaches.
FCNS Security Functions And Advantages
In this section we describe the FCNS security functions and measurements taken in order to ensure a secure network. These functions are explained and compared with similar functions currently used by various architectures.
Security principles. FCNS is based on the principle that no message should be sent unencrypted over the network or between different networks, for example during handoff procedures. This is achieved by having the security layer intercepting both FCNS internal and external messages prior to their forwarding to the layer below or the peer node respectively. In case there is a message sent unencrypted, then an alert message is sent including the node's address and the reason for which the alert has been issued. By having the FCNS internal messages, or primitives, being secured, problems associated with attacks aiming directly at the FCNS are minimised. This would prevent to a great extent an attacker from constructing bogus messages and use them to compromise a connection. This is further supported by the use of the unique keys produced by the user, which make the use of the same security keys over a different connection impossible.
FCNS keystream generation.
Using the FCNS keystream generator, we provide a better alternative to the use of the RAND random bit string used by the AuC in order to produce the master key used for authentication in the UMTS core network. Because the production of the RAND sequence is based on deterministic random generation techniques, very complex and sophisticated mechanisms are required in order to assure that the outputs are as random as possible. In FCNS, the seeds that drive the respective generators are given by the user, making their compromise only possible by actively attack the key exchange mechanism, or physically obtain them from the User Equipment. Moreover, the FCNS keystream is 160-bit long, in contrast to the 128-bit length of RAND, making it more robust than the proposed sequence.
The challenge and response mechanism present in the current 3G proposals is only used for the user authentication, and is independent of the security of the signalling information carried between the network elements of the CN. The FCNS generator is used, in order to provide for the encryption and authentication of the signalling data, so that vital information is not sent unsecured. This "personalised" approach, unique for each user, is realised by the method described in Delivasilis et al (6) . The human voice is used in order to produce the secret keys, using its unique characteristics found in frequencies between 1-2KHz. Digital filters cut off the undesired frequencies eliminating the background noise as well, passing the resulting values to the key crunching technique that produces the 128-bit key used, in order to drive the FCNS keystream generator.
FCNS handshake mechanism.
Once the context of the particular session has been agreed between the User Equipment and the CN (referred to as PDP context in 3G terminology) and the necessary Quality of Service (QoS) parameters have been negotiated, then the Transmission layer initiates the handshake mechanism, in order to establish the communication between peer nodes, usually in internetworking cases. This 10-way mechanism makes sure that the nodes wishing to communicate are indeed the ones for which the connection must be set up. Whenever a node has no data to send, or is not, in general, actively participating in a communication, it sends a message to the network (namely the node_idle message), which indicates its idle state. When the handshake mechanism takes place, the initiator sends a message, indicating that it wishes to establish a connection with a peer. That message is intercepted by the SL, which verifies its contents and secures the intermediate links between the end elements. Upon response by the recipient, the end-toend link is encrypted, further strengthening the mechanism's security. As a final step, the initiator may send its actual request to the recipient, as depicted in Figure 3 . At the same time SL secures the channel, in order to defy channel monitoring and hence man-in-the-middle attacks. These methods guarantee the secured connection establishment phase, which makes the communication process more robust against unauthorised attacks.
Link security. Although the handshake mechanism verifies the nodes' integrity present in a communication, it does not by itself secure the network from traffic analysis attacks. The SL is responsible for controlling the traffic padding techniques applied throughout the network, so that, whenever the channel is idle, a random data generator is used, in order to fill the channel with FCNS messages, containing as their payload random data. Together with the message's security, this forms a strong mechanism against passive attacks, which are necessary to an unauthorised party as a first step into an active attack against the network. This can also be described as channel invisibility, in the sense that it is very difficult to distinguish between real data and random bits generated and sent in the channels.
Other advantages. The increased load in the links may create congestion problems, especially in the case where the traffic padding techniques are not set off when required, due to a particular node problem. In order to avoid the congestion effect, the FCNS error protocol is used, which is responsible for alerting the various network elements of any errors that occur in the network, much like the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP). The major difference between these protocols is that the messages initiated by FCNS are secured, in contrast to ICMP or ICMPv6. By encrypting the FCNS error messages, the network is protected against manipulations of the protocol aiming at DoS attacks.
An additional advantage of FCNS from the security point of view is that different security measures are taken between SL and the various FCNS layers. The secret keys used for example to secure the message forwarded from the Transmission Layer to the End-toend layer are not the same as the ones used for the communication between the Used-Defined Session layer and the Transmission layer.
The above features constitute the main advantages of the FCNS security architecture. Its capabilities are not limited to message security, but extend to the protection of the routing mechanisms imposed by the End-to-end layer, as well as the security of the raw data bits passed to the physical medium by the security layers. FCNS includes mechanisms for the error correction of the packets exchanged in the network guarded by SL, which in a sense makes network security not an option for the operator to choose, but inevitability. Its simplicity over existing architectures provides a robust and efficient architecture that is easy to implement, used and updated at minimum cost, in the case of advances in network technology.
Security Performance Measurements
FCNS has primarily been designed to serve as the means of transferring signalling information between the CN network elements of UMTS. Its use, though, can be extended to any packet switched network for which it can serve as the main stack driving the systems attached to a given topology. Performance and security are, as mentioned, our primary concern, and we have hence focused our tests and measurements in those areas.
Performance measurements. Network performance can be measured in many ways, depending on the topology of the system, which for the calculations includes parameters like link bandwidth (BW), node capabilities, buffer spacing and so on. For FCNS, our measurements are not limited to only testing SL and its features over a given network, but the whole stack as a solid solution. In order to establish a test bed appropriate for FCNS, the calculations have been divided into two categories. The first category includes tests performed in a normal packet switched network, e.g. a LAN or an optical network, where the nodes run instances of our protocol to setup, maintain and teardown a connection. For this reason we are using the CNET simulator developed and maintained by McDonald (7) . The simulator provides a simple test bed, allowing topology creation and tests definitions to measure a system's performance. Using the program we have measured the FCNS capabilities under given processing power and load, round-trip delays, end-toend delays and performance under error situations. The latter include the observation of the system's behaviour in cases, where we intentionally created messages with corrupted headers, corrupted packet, bad timings, timers crashing or set outside the standards of FCNS, checksum errors, false sequence numbers and so on. The intention is to practically verify FCNS efficiency under normal and erroneous operating conditions. Security measurements. In this particular set of tests, FCNS is assessed as a set of rules that can provide for a secured system able to overcome various attacks aiming both at the network and the stack itself. The tests involve the following operating conditions that can be applied as a combination, to simulate as closely as possible a worst-case scenario. False encryption or no encryption at all is a first issue, where an FCNS internal or external message, or even both, are exchanged between the various FCNS layers or peer nodes. No encryption would result in the issuing of a fatal alert message by the SL, which intercepts all the messages sent. The error protocol in turn will halt the communication until the problem is solved, or SL indicates the correction of the error. False encryption includes the use of the same encryption keys, either for two different connections, or between the messages exchanged between SL and the FCNS layers.
In order to achieve full access to the network or compromise a connection between two subsystems, the attacker must first exploit possible vulnerabilities in the link encryption techniques, obtain information about the secret keys used and produced as described in (6) , and finally manipulate with the handshake mechanism. This task is simulated by having established a small LAN with 3 machines running instances of FCNS, two to serve as the peer nodes and the third to serve as attacker. Attacks include the abuse of the FCNS keystream generator and the network databases where the secret keys are stored. Currently, the system has been tested against the operation of the generator, with attacks being unsuccessful under normal operating conditions and operating load. Attacks on the system generating the encryption keys require physical access to the user equipment or the misuse of the algorithm producing them. Attempts to manipulate the algorithm have been unsuccessful, due to the unique characteristics and measures taken to drive the generator, which provide for 95% of key uniqueness.
The measurements mentioned above form a set of observations that is further extended with further calculations and the second phase, which includes the simulation of the UMTS CN based on R99. In this particular set, we test together with the security provided by FCNS, the interoperability of the packet switched with the circuit switched domain of the network and the FCNS efficiency in handling handoff and location update procedures.
